and clinics, along with their regular patients. A subscriber must pick one clinic or office and receive all medical care there. The plan's brochure tells potential subscribers, &dquo;you have a choice of more than 600 participating doctors.&dquo; But you don't. You have a choice of fewer than 150 doctors in about 43 offices and clinics scattered throughout the Detroit area. These are the doctors who have agreed to treat MHMOP subscribers on a regular basis. MHMOP does list more than 600 doctors in a document filed with the state's Division of Health Maintenance Organizations. But the vast majority of these are consultant doctors who may see subscribers referred by l~~ZHMOP primary care doctors.
When asked about the 600 doctors, Dr. William May, the plan's chief executive officer, at first said about two-thirds of them were at the subscribers' clinics. When told that was not correct, he said, &dquo;I never even paid it that much attention.&dquo;
Among the clinics that a subscriber may select are six run by 18 doctors under a corparation known as Park General Clinic. In 1976, the state Department of Social Services (DSS) moved to drop Park General from the Medicaid program for &dquo;abuse&dquo; that included at least $1.2 million in alleged double billings, overbillings and unnecessary laboratory tests. After considerable negotiation, Park General remained in the Medicaid program and DSS settled for the return of over $700,000.
. At least half the doctors who worked at Park General then and were the target of the investigation work at the clinics today. &dquo;That's a dispute between them and Medicaid,&dquo; said Mays, when asked about the situation. &dquo;I haven't had any complaints that they provide bad care.&dquo; Last year, the Michigan Insurance Bureau examined the plan's method of handling patient complaints but couldn't find enough documentation to determine if the grievance system was working properly.
Although the MH1~IOP centers are supposed to provide comprehensive care, many of them are staffed by a single doctor. One, the Birmingham Center in Birmingham, is staffed by a single doctor who works only half-days. Others have specialist services, but the specialists work for several different clinics in addition to their own private practices. Some of the clinics don't take appointments. Patients come in, sign their names, and are seen in their order of arrival. At the New Light Health Center ... a dozen patients had signed up by 9:45 one morning to see the single doctor who began work at 10 a.m. If the doctor spent only 10 minutes with each patient, the last patient on the list would have to wait almost two hours.
MHMOP doctors use some good hospitals -Harper, Hutzel and
Children's. But they also use hospitals like Detroit Central ... formerly Park Community. On her latest inspection visit, last April, Regina Smith, a nurse with the state licensing division, found severe staff shortages, poorly maintained rooms and dissatisfied patients. Record-keeping was so poor that, in three different sections of a patient's record, her bedsore was described as being in three different places on her body, according to Smith's report.
11~IH1~IOP has a problem with hospitalization rates, too. Although its subscribers are hospitalized somewhat less than people covered by traditional health insurance, they still are hospitalized more often than members of any other HMO in Michigan. Such a problem is an indication of poor control over the care its doctors deliver, according to HMO regulators. In June, after some prodding by the state Division of Health Maintenance Organizations, MHMOP began to put pressure on the doctors with the highest hospitalization rates. According to Mays, that rate since has dropped. 1~MH1l~I0P's financial troubles have several sources: its unending battle with the Department of Social Services over Medicaid payments; its high administrative costs, which one of its own officers terms &dquo;out-rageous&dquo; ; and its entry into the private market, always a money-losing venture in its early stages. Ever since MHMOP got its first Medicaid contract, its officials have claimed they are being inadequately reimbursed. For their part, DSS officials charge MHMOP is overpaid. Far from saving the state money, as an HIVIO is supposed to do, DSS officials suspect that it is actually costing them more to care for Medicaid patients through MHMOP than on the regular, fee-for-service market.
Currently, both sides are still arguing over the settlement of MHMOP's 1977 Medicaid claims. MHMOP is expecting an additional $662,000, while DSS claims MHMOP owes them over $700,000. Unable to reach a settlement, DSS has called in federal Medicaid officials ... to do an audit.
In the meantime, with its 1977 settlement still uncertain, MHMOP has posted a $1.3 million deficit in its financial statement for 1978. Plan officials have since revised that figure, claiming a deficit of only $528,000. To help cover that deficit, they have applied for a $1.8 million federal HMO loan. The federal Office of Health Maintenance Organizations, disturbed by the fluctuating figures and the possibility that 1VIHMOP may be in financial trouble, has dispatched its own team of investigators to assess the situation.
And the Michigan Insurance Bureau, which also regulates HMOs, has launched its examination of MHMOP. &dquo;Everything they file with us doesn't jibe,&dquo; complains Mary Lynn Buss, the bureau's director of regulatory standards. The insurance bureau is particularly concerned about administrative expenses, including open-ended expense accounts, $17,000 a month for the use of computers, and a very large number of employes (131) for a plan of its size.
Finally, a management study plan paid for by MHMOP points to the conflict between Mays and Smith as a major source of trouble for the plan. Employes told the consultants they were disturbed and threatened by the power struggle and thought both men were overpaid. Many of the employes also were concerned about Dr. Thomas Billingslea, the $65,000-a-year part-time medical director; they told the consultants they didn't know what he did. The consultants strongly urged that either Mays or Smith be made the clear head of the organization. They said employes think Smith is intelligent, but erratic, tyrannical and lacking in business skills. Mays is considered honest and straightforward, but also lacking business acumen.
Smith sees himself as a man beleaguered by malicious state officials and by some members of his own organization who, he says, are not interested in providing high quality health care. He and others at MHMOP have accused DSS officials of racism, because MHMOP is primarily a Black organization. &dquo;They're wrong, their numbers are funny, and I'm going to prove that,&dquo; he asserts.
-Mays insists that MHMOP has already corrected most of the problems that have generated all the investigations. Administrative costs are coming under control, he says, and financial data is now more reliable. Government officials are less sanguine...... Board members who compiled the report found that management had exercised little control over administrative expenses. None of the plan's departments operate under a formally approved budget, and management apparently does not follow company policy in requiring bids for all contracts over $1,000, according to the report. Adding to the plan's high administrative expenses were a massive $500,000 in consultant fees. The board also agreed with state officials that MHMOP has too many employes, excessively high executive salaries, and pays too much money for its leased space in the Detroit Edison building in downtown Detroit.
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The report also noted &dquo;numerous instances of extravagant corporate expenditures&dquo; for conventions, seminars, trips for executives, and the costly printing and binding of internal corporate documents. Other unusual expenses included the salary of a chief of security for the plan, who, according to the report &dquo;serves no apparent purpose.&dquo; The report recommended the chief of security be fired.
The board's long list of charges against Smith and Mays include many &dquo;questionable payments to the two executives.&dquo; Board members found one bank account, opened without their authorization, called the &dquo;executive payroll account,&dquo; although the report did not say how much money was in the account or how it was used.
On at least one occasion, the report says, Smith received a duplicate salary payment for the same pay period. This duplicate check was not reported on Smith's W2 Form as required by federal law.
The report also said Smith and lB1ays had received excess vacation pay of approximately $27,500 over three years -$13,325 paid to Mays and $14,162 paid to Smith. &dquo;In addition, he (president Smith) has 'advanced' his vacation allotments to encompass a portion of 1980,&dquo; the report said.
Other excess payments noted included $27,734 in sick pay to Smith, Mays, and Billingslea over a two-year period. In addition, the report said, Smith and Mays were reimbursed for expenses that &dquo;were not verifiable as to purpose, reason, or business purpose.&dquo;
Smith and Mays said none of the financial allegations were true, and that board members had either misunderstood the executives' employment contracts or misinterpreted financial data.
Although both Nlays and Smith were charged with failure to develop long-term and short-term goals for the company, most of the management charges appeared to be directed against Smith. Among other things, the report noted that Smith would &dquo;severely castigate&dquo; department heads in front of their subordinates, damaging their authority. Sometimes, the report said, Smith would reorganize whole departments without consulting department heads. As previous reports had noted, Smith and Mays were in open warfare with each other for control of the organization, and the report said Smith would make derisive comments about Nlays to other employes, executives, and board members, undercutting Nlays' authority.
The report found that no objective criteria existed for hiring and firing employes. &dquo;Such decisions (were) based on whim and caprice,&dquo; the report said, &dquo;resulting in former employes bringing numerous civil rights suits against MHMOP.
&dquo;There is an urgent need to establish objective employment criteria,&dquo; the report urged. &dquo;Hiring should be made on merit, experience, qualification, training, and other relevant and readily observable criteria.
Terminations should be based solely on performance.&dquo; The current employment system, which the report termed &dquo;unacceptable,&dquo; has resulted in the firing or resignation of half the staff in 1978....
Minneapolis-St. Paul HMOs &dquo;HMOs May Be Influencing Fee-for-Service Physicians in Twin
Cities,&dquo; Group Health News 20:1 November 1979
The continued growth of HlB10s in the linneapolis/St. Paul area may be affecting the way local fee-for-service physicians hospitalize their patients, according to InterStudy, the area's health care think tank. Hospital admissions for area Medicare patients dropped 6.5 percent last year and their hospital patient days declined 10.7 percent, among the greatest decreases in the country. InterStudy says this may be a direct result of the fact that close to 80 percent of all Twin Cities physicians now have some ties to one or more of the area's seven HNIOS.
HNIO enrollment in the Twin Cities is expected to reach 316,000 by the end of this year, representing 16 percent of the more than two million people living in the metropolitan area. This reflects an extraordinary gain of close to 30 percent each year since 1971 when 2 percent of the population enrolled in Group Health Plan in St. Paul, then the area's only HMO. Since then, six HWOs have entered the market, injecting an element of competition into the relatively prosperous medical community. Fearful that the HMOs would attract their patients, many fee-for-service physicians have signed up for patients in newly formed individual practice associations. One result could be what InterStudy calls &dquo;a spill-over effect,&dquo; prompting non-H11~I0 physicians to reassess their own style of practice and to begin adopting more cost-effective hospitalization attitudes. Linda Ellwein, author of the study and director of InterStudy's Health Systems Demographic Center, says that while current data points clearly to some form of cause-and-effect relationship between the declining hospital admission rates and rapid HMO growth in the community, it is too soon to conclusively link the HMOs to overall hospitalization reductions. However, she says that evidence is mounting that hospital admission practices are changing throughout the medical community and that most of that evidence points to the HMOs' influence. She points out that while utilization review programs by PSROs, local planning agencies, and hospitals are undoubtedly a factor in reduced hospital lengths of stay, HMO influence remains the most convincing evidence of the area's decline in hospital admissions which is unique to the Twin Cities. This is due &dquo;perhaps as the result of the competition among physicians and a concomitant shift in the style of care delivered to all residents.&dquo;
Medical-surgical admissions in the area's hospitals declined 4.2 percent from 1974 to 1976 and 1.6 percent from 1976 to 1978. Longterm care admissions dropped 63.3 percent and 22.9 percent during the same periods. Overall admissions declined 2.1 percent from 1974 to 1976 and 4.4 percent from 1976 to 1978, despite a dramatic increase' in admissions for chemical dependency treatment, which have increased by almost 15 percent each year since 1976.
One result is overall hospital cost savings. In 1978, total hospital expenditures for the area increased only 9.5 percent, well under the increase in the country as a whole. The long-range savings of this phenomenon could be even greater as the HRZOs increase their market share, since the area's HMOs limit their hospital expenditures to 31 percent of their total expenditures compared to the 40-45 percent of total health expenditures that the country as a whole spends on hospital costs.
With a market share approaching 16 percent, the Twin Cities HMO may also be affecting the local consumer price index. The medical care component of the local CPI has increased by significantly less than the national average. In 1975 the medical component increased by 10.7 percent, compared to a national increase of 12 percent, and in subsequent years has been well under the national average. For the first six months of 1979, the Twin Cities increase was 3.2 percent compared to 4.3 percent nationally. This in turn has reduced somewhat the slightly higher rate of increase for the overall CPI, which for the first six months of 1979 was 6.6 percent locally compared to 6.8 percent nationally. The researchers at InterStudy maintain that this could be a major result of the competition stimulated by the H1~I0 growth. &dquo;Young, Mobile Members High Utilizers in St. Paul Plan,&dquo; Group Health News 20:3 November 1979 Single, young, job-changing, mobile people are the most likely to disenroll from NIinneapolis/St. Paul's largest HNIO, according to a recently completed study at the Group Health Plan of St. Paul. Interestingly, they are also likely to visit a health center for care as many as four times in the year before leaving. But less than five percent of these leave because they are dissatisfied with the plan.
John Kidneigh, director of research for the plan, says that the study is the first Group Health has made of the reasons for disenrollment. Although less than four percent of the plan's membership of 125,000 disenroll each year, they represent a significant part of the plan's net gain and loss each year. Despite disenrollment, membership at the plan on an annualized basis has increased seven percent so far this year. However, the lost members in these six months alone represent close to a million dollars in lost income to the plan. But Kidneigh says most of the reasons for leaving are beyond the plan's control.
Half of the losses were due to job changes, but only 14 percent of the terminated members were offered Group Health membership by their new employer; almost all of these disenrollees indicated that they would have rejoined the plan if offered the option. Only 18 percent of the former members moved out of the area, and 28 percent joined another HMO offered by an area employer that did not offer Group Health. Relatively few said they left the plan due to dissatisfaction with the plan's physicians or hospitals. Interestingly, only eight percent of the disenrollees had not used plan services in the year before termination and a quarter had visited a plan facility eight or more times.
